## Chess

## A TACTICAL LINE AGAINST THE FRENCH y not win by playing this highly

aggressive You may not win by playing this highly aggressive, speculative line against the French Defense, but you are bound to have some interesting moments trying.

White: Victor Guala. Black: George Shainswit.

Manhattan Chess Club Championship, New York, 1958.

1	e4	e6	13	d6!	Bd6
2	d4	d5	14	Bh7(i)	Kh8
3	c4!?(a)	de	15	Rad1	Qb8(j)
4	Nc3	Nf6	16	Bf5	Bc6(k)
5	Bg5	Be7(b)	17	Qf2	g6(l)
6	f3	ef(c)	18	Rd6!(m)	Qd6
7	Nf3	b6(d)	19	Rd1	Qc7
8	Bd3	Bb7	20	Rd7!!(n)	Nd7
9	0-0!(e)	Nbd7	21	Qh4	Kg8
10	Qc2	c5(f)	22	Bd7(o)	Bf3(p)
11	d5!(g)	ed	23	Nd5!!(q)	Resigns
12	cd	0-0(h)		14/	

(Annotations by international master Hans Kmoch from "Chess Review," June 1958, pp. 189-90.)

(a) A gambit in the Blackmar family (1 d4 d5 2 e4). It is rarely played in tournaments, never in major ones.

(b) A sound line of defense, most likely Black's best.

(c) Nor can this capture be criticized. Gambits ought to be accepted, after all. The question of whether it pays to hold the gambit nawn comes later.

gambit pawn comes later.

(d) But this move is open to question. It leads to a position in which Black has difficulty getting in the vital . . . c5 with proper effect. At once 7 . . . c5 offers better possibilities, e.g., 8 dc Qd1 9 Rd1 Na6! 10 Nb5 0-0!

(e) It is rather obvious that Black cannot afford to "win" the d"-pawn. After 9 . . . Bf3 10 Qf3 Qd4 11 Kh1 c6 12 Nb5 or 12

(e) This rather opening of the first state of the f

This second pawn sacrifice is practically forced but very

(h) White will win after 12 . . . Bd5 13 Nd5 Nd5 14 Be7 Ne7 15 Rad1 and also after 12 . . . Nd5 13 Be7 Ne7 14 Rad1, and he gets a winning attack after 12 . . . h6 13 Bf4! Nd5 14 Nd5 Bd5 15 Rad1 (15 . . . Be6 16 Bf5!). (i) The removal of this pawn decisively weakens Black's king

- position.

  (j) The move 15... Be7 fails in several ways, e.g., 16 Bf6 Bf6 17 Qf5 g6 18 Bg6! fg 19 Qh3 Kg8 20 Rd7.

  (k) No better is 16... Ne5: 17 Bf6 Nf3 18 gf gf 19 Qf2! Rg8 20 Khl, after which White wins less brilliantly, but that is the only difference. difference.
  (l) Or 17
- (l) Or 17 . . . Kg8 18 Qh4 Re8 19 Nd5 Bd5 20 Rd5, and White wins, his main threat being 21 Rfd1. After the text move, White forces the issue very beautifully.

  (m) A combination with control of the f6 square in view, after

- (m) A combination with control of the 16 square in view, after which mate follows.

  (n) The first point. Black's reply is forced.

  (o) The second point. White threatens 23 Bf6, and 22...f5 fails against 23 Be6 Rf7 24 Bf6.

  (p) Black aims to meet 23 Bf6 with 23...Bh5, and to counter 23 gf with 23...Qe5 24 Bf6 Qe3.

  (q) The last and most beautiful point.

## CAISSA'S GREATEST BOON By CECIL PURDY,

Former World Correspondence Chess Champion
In chess it is possible for quite an ordinary amateur to play like a master. To many, this paradox will sound like the figment of a deranged mind. It is their misfortune that they have never indulged in the hobby of correspondence play.

In order of importance, the following are the essentials in which correspondence chess differs from over-the-board chess:

1) There is virtually no time limit.

2) The pieces may be moved to facilitate analysis.

3) The player may consult books at any stage.

All these differences make possible a mugh higher degree of accuracy in correspondence play, especially for amateurs. The very same differences, however, detract from the value of correspondence play from the sporting viewpoint.

To speak more concretely, world championship matches would produce much more accurate chess if played by correspondence, but they would not be world championship matches!

Chess is so complex that it is given to a very small minority of players throughout their lives ever to conduct a really good game over the board. In correspondence chess, however, the amateur can, and does, vie with the master.

The uninitiated may ask, "Will not the differences between players be just as marked?" The answer is given very well by that logical chess writer, Georges Renaud, in a series of articles published in 1932 in "Les Cahiers de l'Echiquier Francais":

"The principal cause of the difference of strengths in chess arises from inequality in economy of thought. It has long been

arises from inequality in economy of thought. It has long been observed that in a position where the tyro conceives six or seven moves as equally plausible, the amateur considers no more than two or three, while the master narrows his choice to one or two moves.